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Politicians, Policy, and Anxiety
Charlie Kurth, Ph.D.

Department of Philosophy
Western Michigan University
Do we want our politicians to be anxious? The answer may
seem obvious: no. Consider, for instance, what it would have been
like to see John F. Kennedy in the grip of anxiety during the Cuban
missile crisis. Clearly, that’s not what we want—not only does anxiety signal weakness in a leader, but it also tends to bring vicious cycles
of worry, disengagement, and motivated reasoning that undermine
one’s decision making. Instead, what it seems we want in our politicians is strength and resoluteness—the “Iron Lady,” Margaret
Thatcher, not a Woody Allen-like hapless mess.
But recent research on the upside of anxiety suggests that this
condemnation comes too quickly. For instance, experimental work in
political science indicates that anxiety about public policy matters
spurs voters to become more informed, open-minded, and engaged
(MacKuen et al. 2010; Valentino et al. 2008; Brader 2006). Similarly,
work in philosophy suggests that anxiety has an important role to play
in promoting virtuous thought and action (Kurth 2018a, 2018b, 2015;
Nagel 2010; Hookway 1999). So, initial appearances to the contrary,
anxiety may be a good thing. Perhaps what we want, then, is appropriately anxious politicians.
In what follows, I will use a set of historical case studies as
well as research in the social and cognitive sciences to explain what
this appropriate anxiety involves and why it is valuable in political
leaders. The result will be a richer, more complex portrait of anxiety
and its value.
1
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Background: Politicians and their Anxieties
Before getting into the case studies, it will be helpful to say a
little more about the focal question of this essay. In particular, I’m not
interested in the descriptive question: Are politicians anxious? This,
after all, is an easy question to answer. A quick review of the news
headlines reveals that—just like the rest of us—politicians get anxious. Witness: “Amid chief of staff search, Trump increasingly anxious over political future” (Collins 2018); “‘I am worried’: Macron’s
chat with Saudi prince captured at G20” (Borger 2018); “Is Theresa
May right to worry about a hard border causing a united Ireland?”
(Maguire 2018).
Rather, the question I’m interested in is a normative one—
Should politicians be anxious (regardless of whether they actually
are)? More specifically, I’m interested in anxiety as it pertains to policy issues (not, say, dinner choices or existential matters). That is, I’m
interested in things like whether President Trump should have been
anxious about shutting down the government to get money for a wall
on the U.S.-Mexico border. And I’m interested in whether Prime
Minister May should be anxious about pressing for her Brexit plan in
the face of strong opposition from the Labor Party. With this sharpening of the question in hand, we can now turn to the first case study to
start to get some answers.
Case Study 1: The Abolition of Slavery
In this first case study, I want to focus on a couple of examples of anxiety in politicians as they confronted the institution of slavery. Looking at these individuals will help us draw out some lessons
about the value and diversity of anxiety.
The first example concerns the anxiety of the Duke of Wellington when, in 1833, the government of the United Kingdom was
2
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considering legislation to abolish slavery. Speaking before Parliament
on the pending emancipation legislation, Wellington remarked, “Who
can regard the change from a State of slavery to a state of freedom, of
a population of no less than 800,000 persons, otherwise than with
feelings of anxiety?” As Wellington went on to explain, the cause of
his anxiety was the speed with which the institution of slavery was
being dismantled: he was worried that slaves would be freed before
“they had become civilized” (Debates in Parliament 1833: 533-4).
The second example focuses on an episode in the life of the
Quaker abolitionist John Woolman as it he explains it in his posthumously published Journal (1952). Early in his life, Woolman worked
as a clerk and, at one point, his boss asked him to write up a bill of
sale for a slave that he (the boss) was selling. With regard to that request, Woolman wrote:
I felt uneasy at the thoughts of writing an instrument of
slavery for one of my fellow-creatures, yet I remembered that I was hired by the year [and] that it was my
master who directed me to do it … [So] through weakness I gave way, and wrote it. (1952: 26, emphasis
added)
However, when it came time to actually execute the bill of
sale to consummate the transaction, Woolman recounts that “I was so
afflicted in my mind, that I said before my master and the Friend that I
believed slave-keeping to be a practice inconsistent with the Christian
religion” (26-7, emphasis added). Moreover, though Woolman wrote
the bill of sale in this case, the event had a lasting effect on his beliefs
and attitudes. For instance, the next time he was asked to write a similar document, he refused. And the memories of the incident—and the
anxiety it involved—gave shape to much of his subsequent efforts as
an abolitionist (1952: 27).
3
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With these examples in hand, I now want to extract two lessons—lessons that will enrich our understanding of the nature and
value of anxiety that we see in these political leaders.
The first lesson is evaluative: in the cases of Wellington and
Woolman we have two very different responses. In particular, Wellington’s response is problematic. Not only is his anxiety grounded in
morally dubious claims about slaves as “uncivilized,” but his anxiety
appears to motivate his opposition to the abolition legislation. That is,
his anxiety appears to have prompted a self-interested motivation to
protect the status quo. 1
By contrast, Woolman’s anxious response reflects well on
him. Being asked to facilitate the sale of another human being, though
part of his charge as a clerk, leaves him feeling uneasy. Moreover,
and more importantly, the anxiety that Woolman feels leads him to
reconsider—and reject—his initial decision to sanction the sale (as
well as future ones). Thus, in Woolman’s unease, we see an emotion
that brings a concern to make the right choice—one that then prompts
him to rethink his decision and protest the sale.
The second lesson—one that will be important for the discussion that follows—builds from an observation about the nature of the
anxieties we see in Wellington and Woolman: though both are anxious, they appear to be experiencing different kinds of anxiety. To
draw this out, we should first be clear about why it makes sense to see
both Wellington and Woolman as experiencing anxiety (rather than,
say, fear or shame). At a high level, two features unify the unease of
Wellington and Woolman as instances of anxiety. In both cases the
unease is elicited by uncertainty about a potential threat or challenge,
and it prompts a combination of risk minimization and risk assessThe idea that emotions are motivationally-laden, and that particular emotions
shape our motivations in distinctive ways, is commonplace in both emotion research and common sense (e.g., fear prompts a fight/fight/freeze response; compassion brings efforts to help). For more on the distinctive motivations associated with
anxiety, see Kurth 2018a, 2016.

1
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ment efforts. But the details of how these two features manifest themselves are importantly different. It’s these differences, then, that suggest Wellington and Woolman are experiencing different kinds of
anxiety.
For Wellington, we have an instance of what I will call “threat
anxiety.” The Duke’s unease is provoked by his uncertainty about a
potential (physical or social) threat—namely, the unknowns and risks
that he associates with freeing 800,000 slaves. Moreover, uncertainty
of this particular sort brings a defensively oriented response—one that
emphasizes risk minimization (e.g., opposing the legislation to forestall the potential threat). In contrast, to the threat anxiety of Wellington, Woolman displays what we can call “practical anxiety.” His worries are brought about by his uncertainty about the correctness of his
decision to write the bill of sale. Yet given the distinctiveness of this
uncertainty, we get a different reaction: a set of epistemic behaviors—
reflection, reassessment, information-gathering—that are geared toward helping Woolman work through the difficult choice that he faces. 2
With these two lessons in hand, we can turn to see what light
they shed on questions about anxiety’s value for politicians. First, we
get support for the earlier suggestion that appropriate anxiety in a
politician can be valuable. Part of what the contrast between Wellington and Woolman draws out is that, while anxiety that can sometimes
be a liability, it can also be an asset. But given the distinction between
different kinds of anxiety we just made, we can say more. In particular, the two examples suggest that what we want in a politician is
practical anxiety of the sort we see in Woolman, not the threat anxiety of Wellington. Moreover, we also get a sense for why we want appropriately, practically anxious politicians. The Woolman example
See Kurth 2018a: Chaps 2-3; 2016, for more on anxiety in general, as well as, how
we might make principled (and empirically well-supported) distinctions between
different kinds of anxiety.
2
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suggests that practical anxiety is an emotion that undergirds a valuable sensitivity and responsiveness. Woolman’s practical anxiety about
whether to fulfill his boss’s request functions as an alarm, one that
helps him recognize that his initial decision to write the bill of sale
might not be correct. But his anxiety also plays an important motivational role: it initiates the reflection and reassessment that helps
Woolman recognize—and correct—his mistake.
To help drive home the value of this practical anxiety-driven
sensitivity and responsiveness, we can look to cases of other practically anxious politicians. For instance, in her autobiography, the suffragist Elizabeth Cady Stanton recounts the (practical) anxiety that
she felt about getting married. At the heart of her unease were worries
about how she could get married—in an era when marriage entailed,
both socially and legally, accepting subordination and inferior status—while also maintaining her status as a leading defender of women’s equality. Not only did her anxiety appear to help her appreciate
this conflict, but it also spurred reflection that enabled her see how
she could reconcile the pulls of both love and the cause (1898/1993,
chaps. 2–5).
Similarly, Nelson Mandela often remarked on the unease that
the demands of being both a father and a freedom fighter brought. In
fact, these anxieties led him to reflect on “whether one was ever justified in neglecting the welfare of one’s own family in order to fight for
the welfare of others” (1994: 212). Mandela’s anxiety not only reveals his sensitivity to important—though clashing—values, but it
also underlies our assessment of him. Were he not anxious about how
to reconcile his competing obligations to his family and the cause, our
admiration of him as a moral exemplar would diminish.
However, while these examples help draw out why practical
anxiety is a valuable and admirable trait for political leaders to possess, the story is more complicated. After all, as anyone who has experienced anxiety knows, anxiety can lead us astray in all kinds of
6

The Center for the Study of Ethics in Society, Vol. XXV No. 1

unfortunate ways. This is no less true for politicians than it is for the
rest of us. To see how practical anxiety in a politician can be a liability, consider the example of the British Prime Minister Neville
Chamberlain. In 1938, Chamberlain and the French Premier Édouard
Daladier met with Hitler to negotiate what would become the Munich
Agreement, the compact where the Allied powers agreed to hand over
a significant portion of Czechoslovakia to Germany in the hopes of
sating Hitler’s expansionist ambitions. When Chamberlain returned to
Britain after signing that unfortunate agreement, he was called before
Parliament to defend his actions. In response, he explained that it was
“anxiety, . . . not threats [that] made possible the concessions” to Hitler (Parliamentary Debates, 1938). In this context, it seems that the
anxiety that Chamberlain mentions is practical anxiety—anxiety
about the difficult choice the Allied powers faced in their meeting
with a war-hungry Hitler—and it seems this anxiety was (in part) the
driver of the disastrous decision to sacrifice the Czechs. 3
Stepping back then, the claim that politicians should be (practically) anxious needs further defense if it’s to be plausible. In particular, we need to know what—if anything—can be done to prevent
occasions of anxiety-run-amok of the sort that we find in the example
of Chamberlain at Munich.
Case Study 2:
Martin Luther King, Jr., and the Vietnam War
As a start on the question of what we might be able to do to
avoid Chamberlain-like episodes of practical anxiety leading to disastrous political decisions, we can take a look at the decision of Martin
Luther King, Jr., to publicly protest the War in Vietnam.
On the problems wrought by Chamberlain’s decision, consider Winston Churchill
comment: “You were given the choice between war and dishonour. You chose dishonour and you will have war.”

3
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First, some background. In the early 1960s, King recognized
that he would need the support of President Lyndon Johnson if civil
rights legislation was going to be passed. As result, King chose not to
say anything negative about the United States’ involvement in Vietnam. But as time wore on, not only did the war in Vietnam escalate,
but people started calling King out for being a hypocrite. In particular,
they could not understand how King could be so vocal an opponent of
the use of violence in his fight for civil rights, but be completely silent about the violence—the escalating war!—in Vietnam.
These criticisms stung, and as a result, King reversed his earlier decision not to confront the Johnson administration on the War.
The result was King’s famous “A Time to Break Silence” speech in
1967. In that speech, King explained his decision:
As I have walked among the desperate, rejected, and
angry young men, I have told them that Molotov cocktails and rifles would not solve their problems. I have
tried to offer them my deepest compassion while maintaining my conviction that social change comes most
meaningfully through nonviolent action. But they
ask—and rightly so—what about Vietnam? They ask if
our own nation wasn’t using massive doses of violence
to solve its problems, to bring about the changes it
wanted. Their questions hit home, and I knew that I
could never again raise my voice against the violence
of the oppressed in the ghettos without having first
spoken clearly to the greatest purveyor of violence in
the world today—my own government. For the sake of
those boys, for the sake of this government, for the
sake of the hundreds of thousands trembling under our
violence, I cannot be silent. (King 1967)
8
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However, King’s decision to start publicly protesting the War
was immediately and severely criticized (the War, after all, was still
fairly popular in the U.S. in 1967). The rebuke was a surprise—one
that left King unsure about whether he had made the right decision.
Here is how he explains what he was going through at that point:
When I first took my position against the war in Vietnam, almost every newspaper in the country criticized me. It was a low period in my life. … It wasn’t
only white people either; it was Negroes. But then I
remember a newsman coming to me one day and saying, “Dr. King, don’t you think you’re going to have to
change your position now because so many people are
criticizing you? And people who once had respect for
you are going to lose respect for you. And you’re going to hurt the budget, I understand, of the Southern
Christian Leadership Conference; people have cut off
support. And don’t you think that you have to move
more in line with the administration’s policy?” That
was a good question, because he was asking me the
question of whether I was going to think about what
happens to me or what happens to truth and justice in
this situation.
On some positions, Cowardice asks the question, “Is it
safe?” Expediency asks the question, “Is it politic?”
And Vanity comes along and asks the question, “Is it
popular?” But Conscience asks the question, “Is it
right?” And there comes a time when one must take a
position that is neither safe, nor politic, nor popular,
but he must do it because Conscience tells him it is
right. (King 1998, 342)
9
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While King’s reflections and actions are powerful on their
own, I also think they shed light on what we should say in response to
Chamberlain-like issues of anxiety run amok in politicians.
Focusing the second paragraph in the above remarks, the first
thing to notice is that King seems to be reflecting both on his feelings
at the time and on the effect those emotions were having on his
thoughts and actions. So, for instance, in talking about cowardice and
questions about what’s “safe,” King seems to be reflecting not just on
his feelings of fear (or threat anxiety), but also on how those fears
were pushing him to act defensively. Similarly, in talking about vanity and what’s “popular,” King appears to recognize the pull of pride
and its tendency to get him to act in ways that would help polish his
public image. But more importantly for our purposes, there’s also
King’s talk of conscience and the attendant question about what is
right. Here King seems to not only be acknowledging that he’s feeling
something like practical anxiety about his decision to protest the War,
but also that he is aware of how his anxiety is getting him to reflect on
the question of whether his decision was the correct one.
Seeing the richness of King’s emotional self-awareness is significant. It reveals the complexity and skill that underlies the emotional assessment he’s engaged in. More specifically, we see that
King is exhibiting a complex skill: what he’s doing requires him to
have and to engage a range of distinct mental operations. For instance, King needs a capacity for what psychologists call emotion
recognition, the ability to appreciate that the feeling he is experiencing is an emotion, not a bout of indigestion or fatigue. But King also
needs to have the capacity for emotion differentiation: the ability to
identify what specific emotion(s) he is feeling at a given time—fear,
pride, practical anxiety, etc. Finally, King needs to have emotional
knowledge: an understanding of the effects that particular emotions
can have on his subsequent thoughts, feelings, and actions.
10
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Now here’s the thing to notice. A (big) part of what lies behind King’s resoluteness in the face of both the public criticisms of
his decision and his own worries about whether he had made the right
choice was his capacity to engage in things like emotion recognition,
differentiation, and understanding. But if—as it seems—these capacities are skill-like, then they are capacities that politicians can develop
in order to channel productive emotions and redirect problematic
ones. Moreover, empirical work in psychology and cognitive science
suggests that these capacities are skill-like. For instance, Buddhist
techniques of mindfulness and meditation have been shown to be effective ways for individuals to enhance their ability to track their experiences and recognize when they’re feeling emotions, and when
they’re just (say) tired or in a bad mood (Teper et al. 2013; Futsos et
al. 2013). Similarly, exercises that boost people’s emotional vocabulary can help them better identify the emotions that they’re experiencing—it gives them the conceptual resources they need to move beyond just thinking they’re upset; rather, with an enhanced emotion
vocabulary, they can see that they’re feeling (say) anger but not indignation, contempt, or disgust (Kashdan et al. 2015; Barrett 2017).
Finally, various forms of guided instruction have been shown to help
individuals better understand how particular emotions work
(Hagelskamp et al. 2013; Brackett et al. 2012).
These empirical findings are noteworthy for two reasons.
First, they license optimism regarding our ability to shape (practical)
anxiety for the better. What we see in King—the emotional attunement he displays—is a skill that other politicians can develop. Second, recall the earlier observation that threat and practical anxiety are
distinct forms of anxiety. If that’s right, then the above techniques can
be fine-tuned: we can use them not just for anxiety in general, but for
practical anxiety in particular. That is, if practical anxiety is a distinct
type of anxiety, then there is something specific in our cognitive
make-up for the cultivation of these techniques to latch onto.
11
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Stepping back, then, the King example helps us see that the
anxiety-run-amok of Chamberlain is not inevitable. Emotions—
including practical anxiety—are things that can be cultivated. But the
King case also gives us an understanding of what it means to say that
politicians should cultivate their anxiety. It does not mean they should
just feel more anxiety or feel their anxiety more intensely. That could
bring Chamberlain-like disasters. Rather, cultivating (practical) anxiety involves learning to feel it at the right times, in the right way, and
to the right degree. Here the King example gives us a sense for what
this amounts to.
Two Worries: Contagion and Manipulation
The discussion so far—in particular the idea that politicians
should be cultivating their anxiety—is likely to raise worries. I now
want to consider two concerns that might have been raised.
The launching-off point for the first worry is the observation
that emotions are contagious. The basic idea here is familiar. When I
see that you are afraid, disgusted, or happy, that can lead me to feel
afraid, disgusted, or happy too. In fact, scholars as far back as Darwin
(1873), have taken this tendency for emotions to be contagious to be
central to how they’re able to do the important work that they do.
Consider an example. If disgust is an emotion that functions to protect
us from contaminants (poisons, parasites, and the like), then it would
be good for feelings of disgust to be contagious. If seeing your retch
at the (rotten) meat on the table makes me feel disgusted, then I won’t
eat what has just made you sick. Moreover, this tendency for emotions to be contagious is something we see in anxiety—both as a matter of our own experiences (seeing my wife worry about the mortgage
gets me worrying too) and through the experimental work of psychologists (e.g., Parkinson & Simons 2012).
12
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So here, then, is the issue. If we combine (i) the idea that we
ought to promote anxiety in politicians with (ii) the observation that
anxiety is contagious, it seems we’re going to get a more anxious
general public. And that might seem like a very bad result. After all,
both mental health professionals and the news media are sounding
alarms about the growing anxieties of the public. Witness a recent
headline in Time: “A Lot of Americans Are More Anxious Than They
Were Last Year” (Ducharme 2018). Similarly, the National Institute
of Mental Health (NIMH) warns that there are 40 million anxious
Americans—and there’s concern because this number is growing.
To assess this worry, some clarifications will be helpful. The
first thing to notice is that what the NIMH and others tend to be focused on is the growing prevalence of anxiety disorders, not the practical anxiety that’s our focus. Second, the reports of anxiety that we
see in the news are about individuals’ experiences of anxiety in general, not anxiety that is appropriate given the situation at hand.
Bringing these points together, then, suggests that what NIMH and
the media are worried about—disorders and general anxieties—is not
what we’ve been focused on: appropriate practical anxiety. Moreover,
empirical work by political scientists suggests that appropriate practical anxiety—particularly in the voting public—is beneficial: it tends
to promote a more informed, more open-minded, and more engaged
electorate (MacKuen et al. 2010; Valentino et al. 2008; Brader 2006).
So rather than being a problem, contagious practical anxiety could be
a good thing!
To draw out the second worry, a worry about manipulation,
we can start with an analogy. It doesn’t take much thought to realize
that a good book for spotting genuine antiques is also—in the wrong
hands—a good book for making it hard to detect fake antiques. With
that in mind, one might worry that in helping politicians understand
how to cultivate their anxiety, we are just providing them with a
guidebook for how to manipulate public anxieties for their own gain
13
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(Albertson & Gadarian 2015, Edelman 1985). The worry is real. An
often-cited example concerns immigration, where appeals to violence,
drugs, and disease are used to stoke anxieties with the hope of bolstering opposition to more open borders. Witness Donald Trump in the
speech where he announced that he would be running for President:
When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending
their best. They’re not sending you. … They’re sending people that have lots of problems, and they’re
bringing those problems with us [sic]. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists.
And some, I assume, are good people.
In response to this second concern, I want to again start with a
couple of clarifications. First, any system can by hijacked by a suitably vicious person, so it’s unclear that this “anxiety can be manipulated” worry raises issues that are distinct to anxiety. That is, it seems
the issue is not so much with the idea that we should cultivate anxiety
in politicians as it is with the lamentable fact that there are crummy
politicians out there. Second, manipulation efforts work best when the
targets of the manipulation don’t realize that they are being manipulated. This fact about how manipulation works suggests that we can
circumvent the manipulation threat by extending our efforts to promote emotional awareness, emotion differentiation, and emotion
knowledge in the general public.
Put another way, recognizing the potential for the public’s
anxieties to be manipulated points to a general policy prescription: we
should be doing more to promote emotion education. On this front,
there is some interesting work being done. Some of it, informed by
research in psychology, goes under the label of “emotional intelligence” (e.g., Salovey et al. 2008; Goleman 2005), while other techniques build on Aristotelian insights about moral and emotional de14
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velopment being like the development of musical or athletic skills
(Kristjansson 2018, Snow 2015). While this is not the place to get into the details of these proposals, it’s worth highlighting that there is a
substantive and promising research program underway here.
Concluding Thoughts
To bring this discussion to a close, we can return to four questions that we have been wrestling with. First, in response to the question—should politicians be anxious?—the answer is that it depends. If
we’re talking about appropriate anxiety, then the answer is yes. But if
we’re thinking about anxiety more generally, then anxiety is not
something we want to see in our leaders. Second, we’ve learned what
appropriate anxiety is. It’s the practical anxiety of Woolman, Mandela, and Stanton—felt at the right time and in the right way—not the
anxiety of Wellington or Chamberlain. Third, in response to why appropriate practical anxiety is valuable, we can now see that it’s valuable because it brings an important form of emotional attunement: a
sensitivity and responsiveness to hard choices. Finally, we can say
something about what can be done to promote appropriate anxiety in
politicians. Here the example of Martin Luther King, Jr. (and the empirical work that substantiates it) offers a template for what politicians
can—and should—do to shape their anxieties for the better. 4

A version of this paper was presented as part of the WMU Center for the Study of
Ethics and Society Lecture Series. I’d like to thank the audience for a fruitful discussion of the ideas discussed here.
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